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Abstract
Early studies on the reasons for tax evasion focused on economics. When economic reasons were
deemed insufficient to explain all decisions, researchers added psychological and sociological
constructs to their explorations. These studies focused on whether taxpayers see their tax
compliance decisions as ethical ones. For those who believe their choice is ethical, they must
come to grips with their own internal ethical standards and feelings of guilt when they make an
unethical decision. They must then employ some mechanism to disconnect these feelings of guilt
from their unethical decision. Researchers have characterized this mechanism of disconnection
as neutralization, rationalization, and/or disengagement. The current study utilized the moral
disengagement instrument developed by Moore et al. (2012) to investigate whether there exists a
relationship between a person’s likelihood to morally disengage and their likelihood to evade
taxes. The findings indicate moral disengagement is a predictor of the likelihood to evade paying
taxes. This study is the first to make use of this moral disengagement instrument in the context of
tax evasion and serves as a springboard for future research into the psychological mechanisms
taxpayers employ.
Keywords: taxpayer, compliance, decision-making, tax evasion, moral disengagement
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The U.S. tax system is a voluntary system. Taxpayers are expected to file returns and
report the income they have received. Those who pay less than they owe or do not file their
returns at all are considered tax evaders. Tax evasion is not a new notion. Tax evaders have often
been creative. In the third century, Roman citizens would bury their valuables to evade taxes. In
the 18th century, English citizens would cover their fireplaces with brick to evade the hearth tax
(Slemrod, 2007). Modern day evaders include a Minnesota chiropractor who was sentenced to 33
months in prison in April 2017. He did not file his tax returns from 2004 through 2014 and tried
to hide the money he earned by cashing checks at a check-cashing facility instead of depositing it
into a bank account. When he got caught, he tried to pay off his tax liability with a fake financial
instrument that he claimed was worth $300 million (Internal Revenue Service [IRS], 2017).
According to the Supreme Court, tax evasion is considered a criminal offense if the act was a
willful intent to mislead (Cheek v. United States, 1991). An act is deemed to be willful if it is a
“voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty” (Cheek v. United States, 1991; United
States v. George, 2005). If the evasion is found to be a criminal act, the evader can be subject to
a fine or imprisonment or both. Not all understatements of tax or failures to file are willful. A
taxpayer may be unaware of the rules or inadvertently omit income from the tax return. In Cheek
v. United States (1991), the court held that the taxpayer’s good-faith belief that he did not violate
the tax law was a proper defense to willfulness. Research in this area attempts to identify
whether a taxpayer willfully evaded their filing responsibilities. The current study focused on tax
evasion (i.e., the willful intent of the taxpayer to not comply with their income tax filing
requirements). Noncompliance may involve not filing a tax return when it is required, the

7
purposeful omission of income from their tax return, or the deduction of expenses not allowed
under tax law.
Noncompliance by taxpayers reduces the amount of taxes collected by the IRS. The IRS
periodically estimates the amount of tax that should be paid and compares it to the amount
actually paid. The difference between the two amounts is known as the “tax gap.” The IRS
estimates that the federal tax gap for all taxpayers is $441 billion for the period between 2011–
2013 (IRS, 2019). According to the IRS (2019), the compliance rate has not changed
significantly over the past decade and most of the change is attributed to better data collection.
Tax evasion has been and continues to be a serious problem in the United States. Previous
studies on tax evasion identified various explanations for this behavior based on economic,
social, and psychological rationales. Building on prior studies seeking to explain taxpayers’
evasion behaviors, this study sought to advance an ethical understanding of the role played by
moral disengagement.
Organization of the Study
This study is organized into various chapters, a section for references, and two
appendices. Chapter 1 outlines the research problem, theoretical framework, purpose statement,
research hypothesis, significance of the study, assumptions and limitations, and definition of
terms. A review of the literature can be found in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 explains the research
methods. The findings of the study are located in Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 summarizes the
conclusions.
Problem Statement
The study of tax evasion began with Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who defined tax
evasion as the “illegal and intentional actions taken by individuals to reduce their legally due tax
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obligations” (p. 55). Tax avoidance is distinguished from tax evasion in that the former utilizes
legal loopholes in the law to reduce taxes (Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002). Typically, a taxpayer will
underreport income or overreport deductions in an attempt to evade taxes. Previous studies have
supported the notion that ethics and attitude affect taxpaying behavior (Bailey & Plecnik, 2020;
Wenzel, 2005). Grasmick and Scott (1982) found that individuals in their study considered
cheating on one’s taxes to be morally wrong. Thurman et al. (1984) asked survey respondents
whether it was okay to not pay their taxes in some circumstances. The authors found that the
respondents felt less guilty about tax evasion when, for example, they did not know the rules, or
in times of inflation, or if the government wastes your money. These strategies for
rationalization, or “neutralization,” help explain how people justify not paying their taxes. The
neutralization process reduces guilty feelings about an anticipated behavior. Neutralization
occurs in one’s mind before the act takes place (Thurman et al., 1984). Moral disengagement is
similar in that it explains how people justify their immoral behavior.
The current study followed Moore et al. (2012), Bandura (1986), Sykes and Matza
(1957), and Thurman et al. (1984) with the presumption that moral disengagement occurs before
the act takes place. The Moore et al. (2012) instrument was used in the current study as it tests a
variety of unethical behaviors as dependent variables to determine whether the propensity to
morally disengage helps predict unethical behavior. The current study connects moral
disengagement theory to tax-evasive behavior by describing a scenario in which the respondent
must indicate whether they would have reported income they have received when the income is
undetected by the authorities. This study explored the relationship between moral disengagement
and the decision to report or not report the income described in the scenario.
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Neutralization theory was developed originally to help explain criminal behavior (Sykes
& Matza, 1957). Similar concepts were developed in social science research and described as
moral disengagement theory. Both theories help explain how people can justify actions that
conflict with their personal moral beliefs. The purpose of this study was to explore whether
moral disengagement helps explain a taxpayer’s failure to comply with their income tax filing
requirements. When a taxpayer considers whether to comply with the tax laws, they may
experience conflict in making the decision. They may want to cheat on their taxes to potentially
save some money, but guilt may make them aware that it would be unethical to do so. There is a
potential for an individual to morally disengage when their self-interest and morals conflict
(Kish-Gephart et al., 2014). An individual may morally disengage when presented with an
ethical decision to rationalize that decision either before or after the fact (Detert et al., 2008).
Mechanisms of moral disengagement include the use of moral justification, innocuous language,
contrasting the behavior with something worse, displacing responsibility for the behavior,
blaming the victim, diffusing responsibility, minimizing the consequences, and devaluing the
victim (Bandura et al., 2000).
Although tax evasion is illegal, and therefore considered unethical, there are some who
do not always consider it unethical (McGee, 2006). The way information is framed impacts
ethical decision-making (Moore et al., 2012). For example, when business and economics
students were asked if tax evasion was unethical if the system was unfair, or the money ended up
in the hands of corrupt politicians or was wasted, they were less averse than if the money was
spent wisely (McGee, 2012). Dr. McGee (2012) developed an 18-question survey to measure
attitudes towards tax evasion. The underlying assumption in the survey is that the individual
perceives the decision to be an ethical one. The survey’s goal is to determine the participant’s tax
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morale or attitude toward tax evasion: Is is okay to evade under certain conditions? The survey
instrument employs phrases that draw on mechanisms of moral disengagement such as moral
justification (e.g. the money is wasted), diffusion of responsibility (e.g. everyone is doing it), or
blaming the victim (e.g. the government is not entitled to take as much as it is taking from me;
McGee, 2012). If there are times when individuals do not comply with tax laws, is it because
they are using moral disengagement mechanisms? The use of moral disengagement mechanisms
indicates that one has dissassociated from their internalized ethical standards when making their
decision (Bandura, 1986). This dissassociation may allow a taxpayer to feel good about an
unethical decision with regard to taxes. This study sought to understand whether a correlation
exists between moral disengagement and the likelihood to evade taxes. Did the taxpayer who
indicated they would not report all of the income they received justify the decision by means of
moral disengagement? If this is true, then the relationship between the decision to evade and
likelihood to morally disengage should be significant. The results help explain why some
taxpayers are able to reconcile the unethicality of their decision with their own ethical standards.
An alternative explanation may be a misunderstanding of the tax law. Some may believe that
when they receive cash that is unreported to the taxing authority, it is not income and does not
have to be included on a tax return. In this case, there would be no moral disengagement as there
is no unethical act to defend. The decision may be a computational error or misunderstanding of
tax law. Moral disengagement theory presumes the existence of an ethical decision.
Theoretical Framework
Understanding the reasons behind taxpayer compliance with income tax filing
requirements has been explored through various behavioral theories including moral
disengagement theory. Moral disengagement allows an individual to accomplish two goals:
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avoiding guilt while taking advantage of an opportunity that would otherwise be considered
unethical. The unethical behavior happens when one’s self-regulatory mechanisms of guilt and
disapproval become disengaged (Bandura, 1986). I discuss the theory of moral disengagement in
greater detail in Chapter 2.
Need for the Research
Much of the earlier literature has focused on the taxpayer’s analysis of the taxpayer’s
decision-making through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
DeVos, 2011; Jackson & Jones, 1985; Srinivasan, 1973). The theories associated with costbenefit analyses included prospect theory, utility theory, and the theory of planned behavior. I
discuss these theories in further detail in Chapter two as they help explain the progression in the
research from economic to psychological considerations.
Tax compliance research provides a familiar real-world setting in which choice theories
can be explored and expanded upon to apply to other decision-making scenarios. The study of
moral disengagement and unethical behavior has wide applicability outside of accounting in
many everyday facets of life. For example, spreading rumors about coworkers was found to be
positively correlated to moral justification, which is one of the moral disengagement mechanisms
(Duffy et al., 2005). The study of taxpayer behavior is important to policymakers, taxing
authorities, and tax preparers who want to know how to encourage compliance among taxpayers.
Assumptions and Limitations
This study is limited in that the individuals may or may not represent the vast general
population of taxpaying individuals, whose level of income and rate of taxation may vary widely.
The results of this study may not be generalizable to taxpayers in other geographical locations.
This study investigated the relationship between moral disengagement and the decision to evade
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taxes. Additional information was collected including each participant’s age, gender, religious
affiliation, income level, and income source. These variables have been included in previous
studies on tax evasion (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson, 2006). Age, level of education,
and services income have been found to be negatively related to tax evasion (Richardson, 2006).
Khlif and Achek (2015) suggested that future studies should control for these variables as they
have been significant in explaining tax evasion.
Definition of Terms
The following terms are used throughout this paper to help explain previous theories on
tax evasion.
Fiscal psychology. Research models based on the blending of economic and
psychological theories (DeVos, 2011).
Tax avoidance. Tax avoidance involves the utilization of legal loopholes in the law to
reduce taxes (Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002).
Tax compliance. A taxpayer is in compliance if they have filed all required tax returns
accurately, on time, and in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, state rules and
regulations, and court decisions in effect at the time the return is due (Richardson & Sawyer,
2001).
Tax evasion. An illegal activity that involves the taxpayer deliberately breaking the law
by not filing income tax returns or making a false return (Mohamad & Mohd Ali, 2017).
Tax mentality. The degree to which an individual resists paying taxes (Schmolders,
1959).
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Tax morale. The inherent motivation to pay taxes (Torgler, 2007). Alm and McClellan
(2012) considered tax morale as a positive attitude, or “sympathy,” toward the requirement to
pay taxes.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
In the latter half of the 18th century, Adam Smith identified four principles of a just and
utilitarian tax policy. These principles indicated that the tax system should be equitable, certain,
convenient, and efficient. In defining efficiency, Smith believed the government should take out
only as much as it needs to operate. Smith went on to cite instances where the government may
take out more than required, thus making the tax system inefficient and lacking utility. For
example, the government may take out more than is necessary when the government employs
people who are paid large salaries with many perquisites. A tax system may tax a specific
industry so greatly that no one wants to engage in that business, even though it might, if properly
structured, employ a large number of people. A tax system may assess penalties for evasion that
are so extensive they would ruin the payer and thus deprive the economy of their production.
Finally, a tax system may expose taxpayers to excessive audits, which are costly in terms of
money and grief (Smith, 2010). Specifically, with regard to the assessment of penalties, Adam
Smith (2010) noted, “The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the
temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it…” (p. 604). A tax system that assesses
penalties for evasion creates an opportunity for the taxpayer to weigh the cost of those penalties
against the benefit of not paying the tax.
This section provides a historical record of articles identifying determinants of tax
evasion based on economic deterrence models and fiscal psychology. The earliest articles on tax
evasion sought to understand the relationship between economic sanctions as a deterrent to tax
evasion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973). These models proposed a cost-benefit
relationship between the taxpayer’s tax liability and penalties that might be assessed if they were
caught; as long as the amount of the tax evaded exceeded the likely penalty, it was thought that
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the taxpayer would choose to evade. Over time, it became apparent that economic deterrents did
not completely explain taxpayer behavior. Other factors like age, gender, class, education and
occupation, along with attitude toward taxes, were incorporated into what are known as fiscal
psychology models (Lewis, 1979; Spicer, 1974; Vogel, 1974).
Although there was some earlier research on noneconomic factors in tax compliance
(Schmolders, 1959), psychological variables did not become the focus until the 1970s. It was
during this time that the volume of research into tax compliance increased for various reasons.
Some speculate that the increase was due to worldwide economic growth (Webley et al., 1991).
Others blame it on the disparity between the economic growth and amount of taxes collected,
also known as the “tax gap” (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). The increase in research efforts
spawned new thinking around the problem of tax evasion. Having explored economic deterrents
and finding that the resulting theories did not completely explain taxpayer behavior, researchers
have looked to other nonaccounting areas for possible explanations. A predominant area of study
since the 1970s has been on the relationship between ethics and taxpayer compliance
(Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). Early studies indicated a significant relationship between ethics
and compliance (Jackson & Milliron, 1986). Later research expanded on the relationship with
studies of ethics as a mediator between tax compliance and variables that had been studied in the
economic deterrent research, such as probability of detection, opportunity to evade, and
demographic variables, to name a few (Detert et al., 2008). Researchers use the term, “fiscal
psychology” to describe this interplay between economic and psychological factors.
The following paragraphs highlight articles that help explain the shift in research over the
decades from purely economic factors to psychological and social factors. Building on prior
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research, this study identifies the variable moral disengagement as a potential explanation for
taxpayer noncompliant behavior.
The Beginning of History—Economic Deterrent Models
The tax gap spurned much early research around the reasons why individual taxpayers
choose to file or not file tax returns (DeVos, 2011). Research from 1970 to 1990 focused on the
economic reasons for not filing. Taxing authorities wanting to curb noncompliance engaged in
either preventive or detective measures, or both. Preventive measures include the imposition of
stiff fines and penalties for not filing, whereas detective measures include taxpayer audits. The
potential for these measures to be exacted was thought to influence taxpayer behavior. Research
on economic deterrents explored whether individuals would weigh the potential fines or a
potential audit against the money saved by not complying with the tax laws to determine whether
it was worthwhile to not comply (Fischer et al., 1992). These economic models grew out of
research studying criminal behavior to determine whether criminals would be deterred if the
penalties were severe enough (Becker, 1968).
Like any criminal, a taxpayer will decide whether to evade taxes by weighing the cost of
the decision against its anticipated benefit (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). The cost being the
potential penalty, fine, or jail time; the benefit being the amount of tax evaded. The basic model
has been extended over the years to include considerations for risk of audit and perceived
probability of detection (DeVos, 2014; Gemmel & Hasseldine, 2012; Khlif & Achek, 2015;
Richardson, 2006; Yitzhaki, 1974; Yusof & Lai, 2014), tax and penalty rates (DeVos, 2014;
Ghosh & Crain, 1993; Khlif & Achek, 2015; Richardson, 2006), the complexity of the tax
system (DeVos, 2014; Khlif & Achek, 2015; Riahi-Belkoaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006), and
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moral considerations (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; DeVos, 2014; Khlif & Achek, 2015; Richardson,
2006; Yusof & Lai, 2014), among others.
Studies in the 1970s—The Cost-Benefit Relationship
Tax compliance research in the 1970s was based on the economic maximization model,
known as utility theory. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) first applied utility theory to income tax
compliance. Under this cost-benefit theory, the taxpayer will pay taxes only because they are
afraid of having to pay a penalty for not reporting income. Said differently, the taxpayer will
evade whenever the return on the evasion is positive. If the taxpayer can save tax dollars by not
reporting income, the taxpayer is likely to not report if they believe they are unlikely to be caught
nor pay a penalty. The penalty is the economic cost that must be considered against the potential
benefit of paying less in taxes. Allingham and Sandmo indicated ambiguous results with regard
to the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion. There are two different factors to consider when a
taxpayer is deciding how much income to report when tax rates are increasing. One factor
reflects the loss of income a taxpayer experiences when tax rates increase. These results show
that the effect of this income factor yields greater willingness to comply as taxpayers are less
willing to take risks as they become poorer. The study also reports that the return on evasion is
another factor at work at the same time as the income factor. Taxpayers are more willing to
evade when the return on evasion is increasing if it is assumed that risk aversion is decreasing.
For example, if unreported income is $100,000 and the tax rate is 20%, then the taxpayer makes
$120,000 if not caught. If unreported income is $100,000 and the tax rate is now 25%, the
taxpayer makes $125,000 if not caught. Thus, the return on evasion has increased with the tax
rate. For taxpayers who are not risk averse, the greater return will serve as encouragement to not
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report all of their income (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). Later research also indicates that
taxpayer compliance decreases as tax rates increase (Alm, 2019).
Srinivasan (1973) developed a model based on the assumption that taxpayers will
maximize their utility. The author proposed there is an amount of income that, if not reported,
provides the greatest amount of net income. Net income in this case is income the taxpayer
realizes after paying taxes assessed on the amount reported and any potential penalties that may
be assessed on the income that was not reported. Therefore, as net income increases, evasion
should also increase. However, the author admitted there are many other factors that affect a
taxpayer’s decision.
Extending the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, Yitzhaki (1974) proposed that if the
penalty for noncompliance was pegged to the amount of tax and not to income (as in the
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model), the tax rate would have no effect on the risk-reward
ratio. The penalty would rise and fall with the tax rate. Therefore, only the amount of income
would affect the cost-benefit analysis and not the return on evasion as the return on evasion
would not change. Yitzhaki found that a higher tax rate will cause people to be more compliant
as income decreases. Subsequent research contradicts the Yitzhaki model, indicating that tax
evasion increases as tax liabilities increase (Andreoni et al., 1998; Baldry, 1987; Clotfelter, 1983;
Friedland et al., 1978; Pudney et al., 2000).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) authored the original article on prospect theory as a
rebuttal to utility theory. At the time, utility theory was considered the best predictor of decisionmaking behavior. Originally, the theory was developed to predict monetary outcomes that were
simply based on known probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory identifies
two phases involved in decision-making: the editing or framing phase and evaluation phase
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(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The first phase involves an analysis of the options, identifying the
potential outcomes. The second phase evaluates those options and the resulting choice has the
highest value. During the first phase, the potential outcomes are identified as gains or losses.
People tend to dislike losses more than they like gains (Bhattacharjee et al., 2015). If a taxpayer
expects to owe tax with the filing of their return, this is framed as a loss in the taxpayer’s mind.
If the taxpayer expects a refund, it is framed as a gain. It follows then that taxpayers will take
more aggressive tax positions if they expect a loss than if they expect a gain (Dusenbury, 1994;
Schepanski & Kelsey, 1990; Schisler, 1996; White et al., 1993). Prospect theory has direct
implications for taxpayers making compliance decisions as it can be applied when there are a
number of possible outcomes and unknown probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Typically, a taxpayer will not know whether they will be discovered by the taxing authority or
how much it will cost if they are caught, suggesting that prospect theory is an appropriate lens
for the analysis.
Studies in the 1980s—The Uncertainty Variable
Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989) added the variable uncertainty to the economic model.
Their model compares the amount to be collected from a wayfaring taxpayer to the uncertainty
of being audited. The taxpayer does not know whether they will be audited, and this not
knowing, or uncertainty, is due to the randomness of tax audits. The authors maintained that
there is some optimal balance between the number of audits and randomness of the assessments
from taxpayer to taxpayer that would increase revenue. The study is criticized for being too
simplistic in its assumptions (DeVos, 2011). Although risk and uncertainty are not the same,
without uncertainty there is no risk. Risk is measurable uncertainty, whereas true uncertainty is
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not measurable (Knight, 1921). A person may be risk-averse and therefore not want to take a
chance on the risk of audit.
In the 1980s, researchers also studied the effects of increased penalties on taxpayer
compliance. Models indicated that if taxpayers believed they were unlikely to be audited, they
might still be compliant if the penalties were high enough (Jackson & Jones, 1985). During this
decade, the relationships between audit rates, collection rates, tax rates, fines, and complexity
were examined (Graetz & Wilde, 1985; Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Slemrod, 1989). Although
the economic model was still the basis for most studies during the 1980s, it was becoming
apparent that the economic model could not explain the varying results (DeVos, 2011; Slemrod,
1989). The IRS (2014) Oversight Board Attitude Survey supports the difficulties in determining
whether taxpayers pay taxes because of economic motivations in lieu of other explanations. Of
the taxpayers surveyed, 59% indicated fear of an audit would either greatly or somewhat
influence whether they would report and pay their taxes honestly; 93% indicated personal
integrity would greatly or somewhat influence their decision; third-party reporting like W-2s for
wages influenced 62% to report and file honestly; belief that neighbors are reporting and paying
honestly, 41%; and belief that friends and associates are reporting and paying honestly, 51%.
Fear of an audit does not necessarily reflect solely monetary considerations; however, audits can
be costly in terms of time and money. The survey does support the notion that the cost-benefit
analysis cannot explain all taxpayer behavior (IRS, 2014).
Studies in the 1990s—Audit Rates Questioned
One important finding in the 1990s was the realization that taxpayers do not have actual
knowledge of audit or penalty rates. In previous studies, these rates were treated as though they
were actually known, and therefore an external variable. Cuccia (1994) determined that
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taxpayers were not privy to the probability of an audit and penalty amount that might be
assessed. Taxpayers perceived that the rates were higher than they really were. For example, less
than 1% of the returns filed in 2015 were audited (IRS, 2016). The perceived rates were therefore
an internal variable, not an external variable. Other researchers have also suggested that the
actual rates may not really matter; it is the percieved rates that may affect compliance (Andreoni
et al., 1998; DeVos, 2011; Jackson & Milliron, 1986). This perception is backed up by
experimental research indicating that more people should be noncompliant given the low audit
rates (Alm et al., 1995). The inability of these studies to accurately assess noncompliance
indicated researchers should consider psychological and social influences on taxpayer behavior
(Andreoni et al., 1998).
Studies in the 2000s—Looking for New Explanations
Economic deterrents such as taxpayer audits, changes in tax rates, and penalties continue
to be studied in the 2000s (Ariel, 2012; Muh Dularif et al., 2019). Research findings in this
decade support previous findings concluding that tax audits and increased penalties reduce tax
evasion (D'Agosto et al., 2018; Kleven et al., 2011; Muh Dularif et al., 2019) unless the taxpayer
is in a high income bracket, in which case the findings may be reversed (Slemrod et al., 2001).
Yitzhaki’s (1974) previous assertion that an increase in tax rates would increase compliance was
contradicted by Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) whose study indicated that an increase in tax
rates would yield a higher tax benefit as the amount evaded would also increase. Additional
research during this decade supports the negative relationship between tax rate and tax
compliance (Alstadsaeter & Jacob, 2016; Kanagaretnam et al., 2016; Muh Dularif et al., 2019;
Park & Hyun, 2003).
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It is noted that there is increasing interest among researchers into the moral and social
factors influencing tax compliance in studies completed in the first 2 decades of the 2000s (Alm,
2012; Alm et al., 2017; Kafkalas et al., 2014; Torgler et al., 2008). This next section highlights
what are known as fiscal and social psychology models (DeVos, 2011) that blend the economic
deterrent models discussed above with social psychology variables.
Looking for New Explanations—Fiscal Psychology Models
Early Studies
In one of the earliest articles on fiscal psycholgy, Schmolders (1959) provided the
directive for this type of research: “The main task of fiscal psychology remains, however, to
analyze the direct resistance to direct taxation of individuals and nations according to their
general ‘tax mentality’” (p. 341). Schmolders’ idea of “tax mentality” can be described as a
person’s level of resistance toward taxation. Resistance can be measured by comparing the
amount of tax received by the government to the amount owed. This requires some voluntary
compliance by the taxpayers. An alternate method would be to make decisions about a person’s
tax mentality by understanding their commitment to their community. This can be discerned by
observing social and business memberships, professions, and the neighborhood in which they
live (Schmolders, 1959). Tax mentality and tax morale are similar concepts. The former is a
measure of resistance to taxation, whereas the latter measures attitude toward taxes, either
positive (high tax morale) or negative (low tax morale). Schmolders’ definition would allow for
one to potentially have a low level of resistance toward taxes as evidenced by their compliance
with filing requirements, but hate doing it and therefore have low tax morale. Schwartz and
Orleans (1967) studied individuals’ attitudes toward penalties and other sanctions for not filing.
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Their results indicated that tax policies that appealed to conscience were more effective at
deterring noncompliance than threatening penalties.
Studies in the 1970s—Taxpayer Characteristics Explored
Studies in the 1970s began to scratch the fiscal psychology surface. Spicer (1974)
developed a model incorporating social characteristics such as level and type of income, age, and
previous experience with tax audits. The study noted a negative correlation between age and the
likelihood to evade, indicating that younger taxpayers are more likely to evade than their parents.
Vogel (1974) extended the study of noneconomic variables in this decade with their research
correlating personal morals to taxpayer compliance. Importantly, Vogel also found that taxpayers
still evaded even though they did not condone the behavior. This was understood to be an
indicator that intention is not the only predictor of behavior. Later that decade, researchers
examined taxpayers’ ethical attitudes toward paying taxes as an indicator of their likelihood to
comply with the tax law (Song & Yarbrough, 1978). Although the findings showed a correlation
between ethical values and attitude toward tax compliance, the author noted that basic attitudes
are not neccesarily related to actual behavior. Lewis’ (1979) study of social characteristics found
that taxpayers with higher income levels were less averse to tax evasion and they thought
evaders should not be severely punished.
Studies in the 1980s—Taxpayer Attitudes Explored
In their study of 43 articles related to tax compliance from 1970–1985, Jackson and
Milliron (1986) noted that prior research indicated ethics to be significantly related to tax
compliance. The authors also noted the lack of research on the relationship between ethics and
taxpayer behavior prior to 1986. Since then, there has been much evidence supporting ethics as
an important variable (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). The difficulty in measuring ethics has
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continued to be a challenge to researchers since Jackson and Milliron (1986; Richardson &
Sawyer, 2001). Some have asked ethical questions and applied a scale to measure ethicality
(Baldry, 1987), while others have questioned whether the subject would feel guilty if they
evaded as a representation of their ethical standards (Stalans et al., 1989). Regardless of the
manner in which ethics was measured, its significance as a variable in taxpaying behavior was
consistent in studies from 1986–2000 (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001).
The theory of reasoned action (TRA), developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), falls
under the heading of fiscal psychology models. This model suggests that a person’s intentions
determine their behavior; intentions are a function of attitude and subjective norms. An example
of subjective norms would be the individual’s beliefs about whether others would approve of
them evading taxes. The TRA is limited in its ability to analyze behavior in that its two
constructs, attitude toward the behavior and subjective norms, do not consider the taxpayer’s
control over the decision’s outcome (Sheppard et al., 1988). Building on the TRA, Lewis (1982)
examined taxpayers’ attitudes toward tax evasion. They found a significant relationship between
the intent to evade and a person’s moral outlook and the perception that others were likely to
evade (Lewis, 1982). Lewis also noted that further research was needed where actual behavior
could be observed instead of using surveys to gather data. Antecedents to intention include
internal deterrents such as the taxpayer’s moral standards and their perceived likelihood of
detection by the taxing authorities. The external deterrents that have been identified in the tax
compliance literature include penalties, tax rates, and the risk of being caught (DeVos, 2014;
Ghosh & Crain, 1993; Khlif & Achek, 2015; Richardson, 2006).
Studies on attitudes toward tax evasion were prevalent in the 1980s. Grasmick and Scott
(1982) found that taxpayers feel more guilt when they steal than when they cheat the
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government. However, guilty feelings are more likely to deter evasion than theft (Grasmick &
Scott, 1982). Similarly, Stalans et al. (1989) found that taxpayers who feel guilty about tax
evasion are less likely to evade.
Following Song and Yarbrough (1978) and Lewis (1979), Groenland and van Veldhoven
(1983) demonstrated the effect of attitude and situational factors on taxpaying behavior.
Situational factors included income, age, education, tax knowledge, and equity. In this study,
attitude was defined as the person’s evaluation of the tax system. Taxpayers who are older, more
educated, and of a higher income level have a less positive attitude toward the tax system and are
more disposed toward tax evasion (Groenland & van Veldhoven, 1983).
In a study of undergraduate students, results indicated that ethical values affected the
decision to comply with the tax laws (Kaplan & Reckers, 1985). These students determined their
ethical values based on referents other than the tax law, like their peer group and family
members. By comparison, Smith and Kinsey (1987) theorized that taxpayer behavior was driven
more by situational factors and not based on intention. The authors considered factors like
complexity of the tax law and the opportunity to evade. Taxpayer behavior may be unintentional
as a result of not understanding the tax law due to its complexity, and not following it because
ignorance allows for lack of accountability (Smith & Kinsey, 1987).
Slemrod (1989) identified the ability to predict, enforce, manipulate, and comprehend as
aspects of tax law complexity. However, the author did not test the effect of these factors on
compliance due to lack of data on tax evaders. One source of potential data is the Individual
Master File the IRS maintains on the errors they find in taxpayers’ returns. Long and Swingen
(1988) used the Individual Master File to study the relationship between the level of complexity
of a line item on a tax return and number of errors committed by taxpayers on that line item. The
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results showed that greater complexity corresponds to greater noncompliance. The authors
concluded that taxpayers are less able and willing to comply with the tax law when it is
perceived as complicated.
Direct observations are difficult to come by in this area as most taxpayers will not want to
confess their wayward ways. However, Cialdini (1989) was able to obtain direct observations,
which they used in case studies. They found that the complexity of the tax system deterred
compliance because taxpayers feel the complexity makes it an unfair system. Cialdini concluded
that tax compliance could be improved by increasing the taxpayer’s level of commitment toward
paying taxes. Cialdini hypothesized that commitment could be affected by educating taxpayers
(Cialdini, 1989). Of course, simplifying the tax system might also help make the system seem
more equitable.
Studies in the 1990s—Ethics and Tax Evasion
Taxpayers’ attitudes toward tax compliance continued to be the focus of research during
the 1990s. A person’s attitude can be defined as their disposition toward an event as favorable or
unfavorable (Ajzen, 1993; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Taxpayer attitudes reflect that they do not
necessarily see evasion as an ethical question. This was noted when Alm et al. (1992) ran the
same survey twice, once including the word “evasion,” and a second time with no mention of
taxes or evasion. There was no variation in the response with and without the references to taxes,
suggesting that the participants did not connect tax evasion with ethicality.
Surveys from the previous decade indicated ethical beliefs to be related to an individual’s
attitude toward tax evasion when the taxpayer sees noncompliance as an ethical issue (Reckers et
al., 1994). Taxpayers who do not see the compliance decision as a moral one will be more
strongly influenced by other factors such as the expectation of a refund versus a liability (Chang
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& Schultz, 1990). If the taxpayer does consider evasion to be an ethical issue, ethical values are
considered better deterrents to tax evasion than economic deterrents (Smith, 1990).
In an effort to examine the relationship between fairness of the tax law and complexity,
Carnes and Cuccia (1996) compared the complexity of specific tax items to perceptions of equity
to determine whether the complexity of some items might be perceived as justified while others
may not. The authors concluded that taxpayers believe in the need for the tax law to be complex,
but they do not particularly like it.
Studies in the 2000s—Small Businesses and Taxes
Although economic and noneconomic variables continued to be studied in this decade,
greater emphasis was placed on the differences between employed individuals and the individual
small business owner. In a sample of Australian small business owners, Ahmed and Braithwaite
(2005) noted that the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms did not vary between employed
individuals and individual small business owners.
Although the factors themselves did not vary between small business owners and
employed individuals, there was a noted difference in the way the former feels about their tax
responsibilities. Small business owners feel like they pay out of their own pocket for services
they do not necessarily support (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2005). However, employed individuals
do not directly feel this “out of pocket” sensation. Employed individuals are subject to
withholding from their paychecks, and generally do not have to think about writing a check for
their taxes during the year. It is only when they come up short at the end of the year that they
have to physically write a check for the difference. Small business owners are often considered
to be self-employed and therefore not subject to third-party withholding from wages. They must
think about taxes on a regular basis and physically write checks throughout the year. As a result,
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the small business owner has many opportunities to make taxpaying decisions during the year.
There is some evidence that small business owners are more likely to underreport than other
taxpayers (Kirchler et al., 2006). At the very least, small business owners have many
opportunities to not comply with the rules (Kamleitner et al., 2012). Opportunity is a significant
factor in explaining tax evasion (Webley, 2004). Opportunities for evasion exist anytime income
is not subject to third-party reporting or withholding (Williams & Round, 2009).
Small business owners perceive themselves as owners of all of the monies they receive in
their businesses (Adams & Webley, 2001), whether it is earned or simply collected to be
remitted to the government. In countries other than the United States, companies are responsible
for the value-added tax. In a UK study, business owners generally felt they owned the valueadded tax money (Adams & Webley, 2001) when, in reality, they were serving as a collection
agency for the government. This sense of ownership was related to an increase in reporting of
noncompliance (Webley, 2004). One reason for noncompliance stems from the feeling of
ownership and subsequent loss of the funds (Kamleitneret al., 2012). According to Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), a feeling of loss is more painful than the feeling you experience when you
hand over funds you never owned. The authors characterized this as a nongain situation. If the
business owners feel they owned the monies and then had to pay them over to the authorities,
they suffered a loss. If they felt the monies always belonged to the government, the perception
might be a nongain for the same amount of funds. Thus, the business owner may engage in
noncompliance to avoid the feeling of loss (Kamleitner et al., 2012). Paying taxes is painful. It
may be more painful for the small business owner than for the employed because they are more
likely to owe than receive a refund on filing their returns (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2005). Small
business owners who were expecting a refund of $1,000 or more were significantly more
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compliant than those expecting to owe (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2005; Kirchler & Maciejovsky,
2001).
Knowledge of the tax rules increases the small business owner’s chances of business
success (Haber & Reichel, 2007). In the United States, the state tax forms are often complicated,
requiring knowledge of tax laws that may vary from state to state. Not only are the tax laws
complex, but they change often (Chittenden et al., 2003). The cost to comply is highest for small
business owners (Chittenden et al., 2005) who are generally not experts in tax laws, so they must
pay for accounting and tax services. Small business owners have less tax knowledge and feel less
competent in completing their tax returns than business students (Kirchler et al., 2003). In spite
of the feelings of incompetency, they feel like they must participate in the process themselves,
even if it means just keeping sufficient records (Coolidge et al., 2009). Both subjective and
actual tax knowledge relate positively to compliance (Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001; Kirchler et
al., 2006). Also noted in these studies, feelings of incompetence, lack of understanding of the
complex laws, and the costliness of obtaining the help to overcome these obstacles are
hindrances to tax compliance.
One way to avoid those obstacles is to not pay one’s taxes. That thought is not considered
unethical by all people in every situation. According to McGee (2012), there are four views on
the ethics of tax evasion predominant in the literature:
1. Tax evasion is always unethical. It is unethical for three main reasons. First, taxpayers
have a duty to the state to pay taxes. Second, the individual has a duty to the rest of
the taxpayers. All consumers should contribute to the provision of services. Third, we
all have a duty to God to pay our taxes.
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2. There is no duty to pay taxes. The taking of taxes is equivalent to the taking of
property by force. The government is stealing from us.
3. Tax evasion is sometimes unethical.
4. The taxpayer actually has a duty to not pay taxes in some circumstances.
Robert McGee has written or cowritten over 900 articles on tax evasion. He summarized his
surveys of various populations finding that people mainly justify tax evasion when they cannot
afford their tax bill, when the government is corrupt, or they disagree with the way the
government is spending their money (McGee & Benk, 2019).
If these reasons sound like rationalizations, they may well be. The theory of moral
disengagement holds that we all want to think we are doing the right thing while we are acting
unethically (Bandura, 1986). To reconcile our actions with our ethical values, we may morally
disengage by utilizing various mechanisms. These mechanisms include justification on moral
grounds—the government is wasting my money or the government is corrupt. Other mechanisms
include blaming others (e.g., the government) and distorting the consequences (Bandura et al.,
2000). The current study sought to shed some light on the factors that influence taxpayers
making the compliance decision. The taxpayer may be more inclined to moral disengagement
and unethical decision-making when there is a greater likelihood of personal gain (Kish-Gephart
et al., 2014). The effects of the influence of the personal gain motivation may be less for people
who are highly conscientious (Kish-Gephart et al., 2014). The theory of moral disengagement is
discussed in greater detail below.
In the taxpaying scenario, the personal gain is equivalent to the money saved by not filing
a tax return. The question here is, are taxpayers more motivated by personal gain than by their
ethical values? What is interfering with their ethical decision-making process? The cost/benefit
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studies discussed previously often indicated that every taxpayer performs this mental cost-benefit
analysis before deciding to correctly file their tax returns. However, these studies often
conflicted, and most would agree they did not explain every behavior. It follows then, that not
everyone performs the cost-benefit analysis all of the time. Those who do perform this analysis
do not have strongly internalized moral norms (Kroneberg et al., 2010).
A review of the literature indicates substantial research has been done on the economic
deterrents to tax evasion. The considerations, however, are not limited to economic costs. It is
apparent that there are psychological and social considerations as well. Khlif and Achek (2015)
recapped studies to date:
In sum, the general implications of these theories are that tax evasion is deterred by
sanctions, can be viewed as an economic decision under uncertainty in which taxpayer
estimates the economic advantages and costs of tax evasion and tax noncompliance can
be explained by non-economic factors related to taxpayers’ attitudes and perception on
compliance. (p. 489)
This next section explores the theory of moral disengagement and its potential for explaining
taxpayer compliance behavior.
Moral Disengagement
The theory of moral disengagement is an offspring of social cognitive theory. Social
cognitive theory holds that individuals make decisions according to personal standards of moral
behavior. These standards help guide and regulate behavior (Bandura, 1986). If a person acts
counter to their own personal standards, they will evaluate themselves negatively and censure
their own behavior (Bandura, 1999). Therefore, individuals will generally act in ways that are
consistent with their own personal standards. Bandura (1999) maintained that this regulatory
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function operates only when it is activated, and it can be deactivated by means of moral
disengagement.
Although there is still much to be discovered, it is observed that moral disengagement
may occur before one begins to deliberate over a course of action (Moore et al., 2012) by
employing one of its mechanisms. Similarly, Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura et al. (1996)
stressed that the mechanisms of moral disengagement precede and are therefore involved in
causing the immoral act (Ribeaud & Eisner, 2010). Mechanisms of moral disengagement include
(a) the use of moral justification, (b) innocuous language, (c) contrasting the behavior with
something worse, (d) displacing responsibility for the behavior, (e) blaming the victim, (f)
diffusing responsibility, (g) minimizing the consequences, and (h) devaluing the victim (Bandura
et al., 2000). Individuals who use moral justification, innocuous language, and advantageous
comparison are justifying their behavior by characterizing the harm they are doing as something
other than it really is. Hiring young children to work in sweat shops is better than letting their
families go hungry. Beating out the competition is a euphemism for lying to your customers.
Bombing a residential neighborhood is collateral damage. At work, employees may blame their
employer for their bad behavior, thereby displacing or diffusing the responsibility. Noncompliant
taxpayers may feel they are not really hurting anyone, thus minimizing the consequences. A
complicated income tax system may be blamed for noncompliance, making the state (victim) to
blame. The likelihood to morally disengage is positively related to unethical organizational
behavior (Moore et al., 2012). Unethical acts in organizations have been tied to rationalizations
that include displacement of responsibility, blaming the victim, and minimizing the
consequences (Anand et al., 2005). Corporate taxpayers involved in offshore tax schemes often
displace responsibility, minimize the consequences, and blame the victim to rationalize their
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behavior (Evertsson, 2019). Although the literature identifies specific contexts in which moral
disengagement is a likely explanation, not enough studies have been done to conclude that moral
disengagement does not vary with context (Paciello et al., 2008). If specific contextual influences
trigger moral disengagement, then specific moral disengagement mechanisms may be triggered
when anticipating a tax compliance decision. Table 1 provides examples of each of the eight
justification mechanisms Bandura et al. (2000) identified. The language used in the study was
meant to portray everyday circumstances where an individual may justify their behavior to
determine a general propensity to morally disengage.
Table 1
Sample Justification Language
Justification Mechanism
(Bandura et al., 2000)
Moral justification

Using innocuous language
Contrasting the behavior

Displacement of responsibility
Blaming the victim
Diffusion of responsibility
Minimization of consequences
Devaluing the victim

Justification Language
I am doing them a favor by eating this
meal, they would have thrown the food
away anyway so I should not have to pay
for it.
Killing civilians in time of war is
collateral damage.
I am just looking at the exam answers
before the test. It’s not like I’m copying
them like some of my friends.
My boss asked me to do it.
It was the cashier’s fault she made a
mistake.
Everyone is doing it.
It’s not harming anyone.
They deserved it.
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People not only tend toward moral disengagement (Detert et al., 2008; Duffy et al., 2005;
Moore et al., 2012), but certain situations where there is an opportunity for personal gain may
trigger it (Kish-Gephart et al., 2014). In some situations, personal interest is a powerful motivator
(Moore & Lowenstein, 2004). The opportunity to save money by not paying taxes may be one
such motivator. Self-interest may conflict with one’s moral standards when there is an
opportunity for personal gain. Furthermore, unethical behavior results when self-interest
conflicts with one’s moral standards and self-interest prevails (Bandura, 1986). The unethical
behavior happens when one’s self-regulatory mechanisms of guilt and disapproval become
disengaged (Bandura, 1986). The actor no longer perceives their behavior as offensive because
they have justified it morally and/or socially (Bandura et al., 2000). People want to benefit
themselves, but they also want to feel good about their decisions (Bandura, 1986; Batson et al.,
2003; Cooper, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Jones & Ryan, 1997; Kunda, 1990;
Tsang, 2002). Moral disengagement allows an individual to accomplish both goals: avoid guilt
while being opportunistic.
The relationship between moral disengagement and unethical decision-making has been
supported in studies involving children (Bandura et al., 2001; Bandura et al., 1996) and adults
(Detert et al., 2008; Duffy et al., 2005). McGee (2012) identified specific situations in which
taxpayers are asked to decide whether tax evasion is ethical. Generally, the author found that tax
evasion is sometimes unethical. The McGee studies did not assume that tax evasion is always
unethical. The studies assumed the respondents were making an ethical analysis of the question.
In other words, the assumption was that tax evasion is an ethical question. Noncompliance with
the tax rules may be ethical or unethical depending on the circumstances (McGee, 2012).
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The current study aimed to discover whether individuals are likely to morally disengage
within the specific context of tax evasion. In other words, could their decision to evade be the
result of some rationalization or justification mechanism? In an early study on neutralization
strategies, Thurman et al. (1984) developed statements related to tax evasion to test the use of
these strategies. The neutralization mechanisms are similar to the Bandura et al. (2000)
mechanisms as seen in Table 2. The current study sought to explore whether a taxpayer who
indicates a likelihood to evade taxes is also likely to use moral disengagement justification
mechanisms. Thurman et al. studied taxpayer attitude toward evasion and the use of
neutralization mechanisms to justify the attitude. Although neutralization mechanisms may
predict behavior, Thurman et al. did not present a scenario in which the study participants were
required to make a decision as to whether they would comply with the tax rules. Thurman et al.
(1984) outlined the similarities between moral justification mechanisms and neutralization
techniques (as shown in Table 2) and provided support for the theory that taxpayers may justify
evasion by implementing moral disengagement mechanisms.
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Table 2
Justification Mechanisms and Neutralization Statements
Justification
Mechanism
(Bandura et al., 2000)

Moral justification
Euphemistic language

Displacement of
responsibility

Dehumanization

Neutralization
Techniques (Sykes
& Matza, 1957)

Neutralization Statements
(Thurman et al., 1984)

Appeal to higher
loyalties
Euphemistic
language (implied)

It is okay to claim underserved tax
deductions or fail to report certain
income when you have donated
more to charities and worthy
causes than you are allowed to
deduct.

Denial of responsibility

It is okay to claim an undeserved
tax deduction in the case where
you are not really sure what the
rule is.

Denial of the victim

Distortion of
consequences

Denial of injury

Advantageous
comparison

Appeal to higher
loyalties

Attribution of Blame

Denial of the victim

It is okay not to report income
since inflation requires that you
hold onto every dollar possible.
It is not so wrong to fail to report
certain income since it does not
really hurt anyone.
It is all right to occasionally fail to
report certain income or claim an
undeserved tax deduction since
you are generally a very loyal and
law-abiding citizen.
It is not wrong to fail to claim
certain income on your tax return
since the government is often
careless with your tax dollar.

Percent not
strongly
disagreeing
(Thurman et
al., 1984)

50.0

61.4

48.6
53.1

46.6

50.0

Using the Thurman et al. (1984) study as a guide, the current study attempted to identify
which moral disengagement mechanisms taxpayers are likely to use. The next section describes
the methodology used to examine whether a correlation exists between the justification
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mechanisms Bandura et al. (2000) identified and an individual’s likelihood to evade, and if so,
the mechanism most likely to be used.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This chapter discusses the research design, population and sample, sampling procedure,
instrumentation, data collection procedures, data analysis, and limitations. The purpose of this
study was two-fold. First, I aimed to determine whether the relationship between the general
likelihood to morally disengage is positively related to the intention to evade taxes. Second, I
sought to discover if there is a positive relationship to determine whether there is a significant
relationship between the likelihood to evade taxes and likelihood to utilize a specific mechanism
to do so. The eight mechanisms under consideration were those identified in Moore et al.’s
(2012) study. These questions were designed to provide more focus to the moral disengagement
literature by shedding light on one of the contexts in which moral disengagement may operate
and identifying the mechanisms used within that specific context. This study is meant to be a
first step in determining which of the various mechanisms predict tax-evasive behavior.
Exploration of specific contexts in which moral disengagement may be apparent is noted as a
gap in the literature (Moore et al., 2012). A summary of the hypotheses identified below are also
listed in Table 5.
I sought to determine whether there is a significant relationship between the likelihood to
morally disengage and likelihood to evade taxes. The research question therefore was as follows:
Is there a significant relationship between the likelihood to morally disengage and
likelihood to evade taxes?
If the relationship between the general likelihood to morally disengage and intent to
evade is positive, taxpayers who are likely to be morally disengaged will also be likely to evade
taxes. If the relationship between the likelihood to evade taxes and likelihood to morally
disengage is significant, the first hypothesis would be supported.
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H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between the likelihood to evade taxes
and likelihood to morally disengage.
The literature supports the notion that specific moral disengagement mechanisms may be
used more often in some situations than others (Kish-Gephart et al., 2014). It may be helpful to
taxing authorities to understand which disengagement mechanisms taxpayers use most. An
understanding of the taxpayers’ thought processes would aid in designing an approach to curb
evasion. It is notable from the data provided above in the Thurman et al. (1984) study that of all
of the neutralization techniques, the one that was claimed most often was the denial of
responsibility. This is evidenced by the 61.4% of participants who did not strongly disagree with
the statement that it was okay to take an unwarranted tax deduction if you do not understand the
rules. The Thurman et al. study has not been replicated since its first publication. The current
study tested the results of the Thurman et al. study, specifically for the indication that of those
participants who are likely to morally disengage will do so by not taking responsibility for their
actions. Therefore, the second research hypothesis of this study was as follows:
H2: There is a significant relationship between displacement of responsibility and the
anticipated decision to evade taxes.
Blaming the government is another way taxpayers may justify not paying their taxes.
Bandura et al. (2000) classified this specific type of displacement of responsibility as “attribution
of blame.” This moral justification mechanism is distinguished from displacement of
responsibility, which claims no responsibility, by specifically identifying the government as the
one to blame for one’s lack of compliance. If taxpayers are likely to use the mechanism,
attribution of blame to evade taxes, the following hypothesis would be supported:
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H3: There is a significant relationship between attribution of blame and the anticipated
decision to evade taxes.
The tax gap and ever-increasing national debt have long been concerns for the American
public. It may be worthwhile when designing communications with taxpayers to know whether
taxpayers are unaware of the effect of their taxpaying decisions on the national debt. Given the
recently reported estimated tax gap at $441 billion for the period 2011–2013 (IRS, 2019), and
ongoing increases to the national debt, communicating the effect of noncompliance decisions
may have a valuable impact on tax compliance. Taxpayers who distort the consequences of their
actions and deny injury indicate this thought pattern with “It is not so wrong to fail to report
certain income since it does not really hurt anyone” (Thurman et al., 1984, p. 315). Slightly over
53% of the Thurman et al. (1984) study participants indicated this neutralization technique. The
current study served to validate this as an indicator that a taxpayer may use this specific
technique when deciding to not comply with the tax rules because they do not connect paying
their taxes with an increase in the national debt. If the use of this specific moral disengagement
mechanism is significant, the following hypothesis would be supported:
H4: There is a significant relationship between distortion of consequences and the
anticipated decision to evade taxes.
Similar to the technique, distortion of consequences, is the belief that tax evasion is a
victimless crime. The lack of a victim is noted in Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization
technique, “denial of injury.” Bandura et al. (2000) characterized this technique as
“dehumanization.” In other words, the victim should not be treated like a human being;
therefore, there is no human victim nor injury. If taxpayers hold to this belief and are also likely
to evade taxes, the following hypothesis would be supported in the current study:
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H5: There is a significant relationship between dehumanization and the anticipated
decision to evade taxes.
The Thurman et al. (1984) study noted that 50% of respondents indicated it is okay to fail
to report certain income if you can morally justify your actions because of your other many
virtuous activities. Moral justification can also be used when one would claim it is okay to not
report certain income because the taxes will be used by a corrupt government or a cause you do
not believe in. If the participants in the current study applied this specific moral disengagement
technique, the following hypothesis would be supported:
H6: There is a significant relationship between moral justification and the anticipated
decision to evade taxes.
The moral disengagement technique, advantageous comparison, is similar to moral
justification in that the taxpayer will compare their actions to less desirable actions. The
Thurman et al. (1984) study suggested the taxpayer will mentally argue they are generally a lawabiding citizen, so fudging on one’s taxes is no big deal. Moore et al. (2012) would say fudging a
little bit is not the same as fudging a lot, like other people do. If the participants in this current
study utilized this specific moral disengagement mechanism, the following hypothesis would be
supported:
H7: There is a significant relationship between advantageous comparison and the
anticipated decision to evade taxes.
A tax evader may decide not to report all of their income as a “business decision” or to
“offset a budgetary shortfall.” These are examples of euphemistic language used to justify tax
evasion. If a taxpayer is prone to using this type of euphemistic language to justify their taxevasive intentions, the following hypothesis would be supported in the current study:
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H8: There is a significant relationship between euphemistic language and the anticipated
decision to evade taxes.
Lastly, a taxpayer may take their moral cues from what they believe everyone else is
doing. If they believe everyone is cheating on their taxes, then it must be okay. This is
characterized as diffusion of responsibility (Moore et al., 2012). The person agreeing with this
approach to moral disengagement will likely agree with the statement, “People can’t be blamed
for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too” (Moore et al.,
2012). If the taxpayer is also likely to evade taxes, the following hypothesis would be supported:
H9: There is a significant relationship between diffusion of responsibility and the
anticipated decision to evade taxes.
Research Design
This study is quantitative. The most commonly used correlation is the Pearson correlation
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 2008). I anticipated that the Pearson correlation would be the appropriate
measure to assess the relationship between the likelihood to evade taxes and moral
disengagement and likelihood to evade taxes and each of the moral disengagement mechanisms.
The main assumption of a Pearson correlation requires that the variables are continuous and have
a linear relationship (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2008).
Some researchers view Likert scales as being strictly categorical, and therefore not
subject to parametric analysis (Jamieson, 2004; Miller & Salkind, 2002). However, some studies
have indicated a parametric analysis is appropriate when the data are not ordered on an interval
scale and do not reflect equal differences in magnitude (Baggaley & Hull, 1983; Baker et al.,
1966; Glass et al., 1972; Labovitz, 1970). The number may be a representation of a level of
agreement with the question or statement (Harpe, 2015) and there may be an infinite number of
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unequal values between the levels of agreement. One’s likelihood to morally disengage is more
accurately portrayed as a tendency represented by a number along a continuum. Pearson is
appropriate when the variable is continuous (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2008). In addition, the
Pearson correlation is appropriate when the relationship is expected to be linear. Spearman
would be more appropriate for a nonlinear relationship. It is noted that the authors of the
instrument used in the current study reported results utilizing ordinary least squares regression
analysis (Detert et al., 2008), indicating a linear relationship among the variables. A scatterplot
matrix was used to examine the relationship across variables. Examination of the matrix revealed
that the relationship was linear in nature and no variables were found to be curvilinear. The
assumption for Pearson was therefore met.
Likelihood to commit tax evasion was measured by participants’ responses to the Bailey
and Plecnik (2020) scenario and survey (see Appendix A). This survey consists of one question
that asks participants to rate on a Likert scale how likely they would be to make the same
decision as in the scenario. There are eight subscales within the moral disengagement instrument
(see Appendix B). A composite score was computed for moral disengagement in accordance
with the instrument authors’ process. Descriptive statistics were calculated for demographic
variables and each of the variables of interest.
Cronbach’s alpha tests variables to determine how closely related a set of test questions
are as a group (Taber, 2018). The reliability of the moral disengagement survey was verified
with a Cronbach’s alpha reliability analysis (α=.90). According to George and Mallery (2016),
Cronbach’s alpha values of .70 or greater indicate acceptable reliability. Cronbach’s alphas
cannot be calculated for each subscale or the likelihood to commit tax evasion, as they are
comprised of only one survey question each.
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The results of the correlation indicated the strength and magnitude of the relationship
between the variables, and the correlation coefficients, r, were expected to be somewhere
between -1 and 1. A coefficient of 0 would indicate that there is no relationship between the
variables, whereas a coefficient of 1 or -1 represents a perfect positive or perfect negative linear
relationship between the variables. Additionally, positive coefficients indicate that as one
variable increases, the other variable also increases, whereas negative coefficients indicate that as
one variable increases, the other variable decreases. Cohen's standard was used to evaluate the
correlation coefficient, where 0.10 to .29 represents a weak association between the two
variables, 0.30 to 0.49 represents a moderate association, and 0.50 or larger represents a strong
association (Cohen, 1988).
Population and Sample
The population of this study includes individual taxpayers chosen at random by Survey
Monkey. The participants were selected because of the convenience of access to them through
the survey software platform. Convenience sampling is common as it allows the researcher the
ability to determine the appropriateness of the participants (Carland et al., 2001). The potential
participants were selected randomly by Survey Monkey. Survey Monkey charges researchers a
fee to use this service. The measures used to select the participants included number of years of
experience filing a tax return as an indicator of taxpaying history along with additional
demographic information such as age, gender, and education, which were collected concurrently.
Previous studies have indicated that demographic information may be a factor in tax evasion
decision-making (Moore et al., 2012).
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Sampling Procedure
The data were collected and imported from Survey Monkey into SPSS (2021) online
computer software for analysis. Participants with missing responses were excluded from the
analysis. The use of Survey Monkey provides for anonymity. In the process of administering the
surveys, the participants were informed that their participation is voluntary and anonymous, and
that the information provided would be used solely for the purpose of this study. As in the Bailey
and Plecnik (2020) study, participants were selected who have been working in the United States
for 3 or more years at a job paying at least the amount equal to the standard deduction for their
marital status. Bailey and Plecnik indicated this would ensure that those selected would have
experience with filing returns as income below that amount may be exempt from filing.
Research indicates responses to electronic surveys range from 1% to 33% (Nulty, 2008).
The most commonly used confidence level is 95% (McLeod, 2019). A power analysis for a
Pearson product-moment correlation test was calculated using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). The
calculation indicated that the minimum sample size to yield a statistical power of at least .8 with
α =.05 and a medium effect size (r = .3) is 85. The participants were screened by Survey Monkey
prior to taking the survey. One hundred eighty-nine individuals responded to the survey,
resulting in 162 usable responses.
Instrumentation
Moral Disengagement Instrument
Moore et al. (2012) developed the moral disengagement instrument used in the current
study to measure one’s disposition toward moral disengagement. The researchers sought to
determine whether the propensity toward moral disengagement could explain unethical behavior
by employees in an organization. That study concluded the likelihood to morally disengage was
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strongly correlated with unethical decision-making and behavior (Moore et al., 2012). Three
scales were developed during the course of the Moore et al. study. The first, a 24-item scale
(α=.90) was reduced to 16 items (α=.88) and finally to 8 items (α=.80). The reductions were
made based mostly on theoretical grounds to make it easier to use in research. The 8-item scale
was used in the current study and is included in Appendix A. The 8-item scale is the scale used
predominantly in surveys related to business ethics, as can be seen in Table 3. The instrument
uses a Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree to assess the participants’
likelihood to morally disengage under the described circumstances. The instrument has been
used in multivariate analysis as well as single-factor analysis (Moore et al., 2012). I obtained
permission to use the instrument from one of the authors, Dr. Detert, via email correspondence.
A summary of the studies related to business topics relying on either the 8-item, 16-item, or 24item scales (Moore et al., 2012) can be found in Table 3. These studies, performed in business
settings, indicate the reliability of the Moore et al. instrument to be acceptable as Cronbach’s
alpha values of .7 or higher are generally acceptable (Nunnally, 1978).
Table 3
Summary of Selected Moral Disengagement Studies
References

Beaudoin et al.
(2015)

Business Context

Moral
Disengagement
Measure

Sample
Size and
Description

Findings

Earnings
management

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

83 financial
statement
preparers

α=.76
β=.025
t=.21
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References

Business Context

Moral
Disengagement
Measure

Sample
Size and
Description

Findings

Supervisor M/D*;
Employee M/D

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

172
working
adults

α.=88;
α.=93
B=-0.21;
B=-0.14
t=-1.36;
t=-1.26

Chen et al. (2016)

Organizational
behavior

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

73 franchise
owners

α=.83
B=.42
F=9.61;
p<0.01

Christian and Ellis
(2014)

Turnover intentions

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

44 Nurses

α=.96
β=.32
p<.01

He et al. (2017)

Citizenship
relationship to MD

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

293
employees

α=.81
β=0.22
p<0.01

Keem et al. (2018)

Employee behavior

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

171
employees

α=.87
B=.36
p<0.01

Organizational
behavior

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

230 adults
(Qualtrics
Panel)

α=.87
β=.33
p<0.01

Samnani et al.
(2014)

Employee behavior

Detert et al.
(2008) (24
item)

221
students

α=.90
β=.18
p<0.01

Tasa and Bell
(2017)

Business negotiations

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

168 MBA
students

α=.83
μ=1.68
σ=.58

Bonner et al.
(2016)

Lee et al. (2017)
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References

Business Context

Moral
Disengagement
Measure

Sample
Size and
Description

Findings

Valle et al. (2017)

Organizational
politics

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

101
students

α=.87
μ=1.86
σ=.78
r=.31
p<.001

Zheng et al. (2017)

Employee behavior

Moore et al.
(2012) (8 item)

574
employees

α=.88
ŷ=-.58
p<.001

Note. *MD = Moral Disengagement

Income Tax Scenario
The current study provided a scenario describing a taxpayer who, in addition to W-2
wages, receives cash income for work done on the side. The taxpayer decides not to report the
additional income to the IRS. Each survey participant was asked about the likelihood that they
would have made the same decision based on a Likert scale. Bailey and Plecnik (2020)
developed the scenario, which can be found in Appendix B. Bailey and Plecnik devised the
scenario in their study on the likelihood to comply with tax laws by individuals with certain
personality traits. The study concluded that the intention to evade, as measured by this scenario,
correlates with the likelihood of judging a friend who acted according to the scenario. As this
was a recent study, the vignette has not been tested except by the authors. The vignette produced
similar correlation results in the testing and retesting of 340 participants in an initial test and
another 340 participants in a subsequent test (P = 0.80, Cohen’s d = .05). Taxpayers’ intention
was measured both before and after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) became effective. The
study’s main dependent variable was the intent to evade taxes. There was not a significant
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change in the correlations before and after the TCJA. Intention to evade significantly correlated
with four variables relevant to the current study (see Table 4).
Table 4
Variables Correleated with Intention to Evade
Variable

r value before TCJA

r value post TCJA

Likelihood to be punished

-0.453

-0.402

Likelihood to be punished harshly

-0.249

-0.265

Commitment to paying taxes

-0.450

-0.490

-0.262

-0.267

Desire for government approval
Note. TCJA = Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

The authors noted that the income stated in the scenario reflects the median income in the United
States at the time the study was conducted. The IRS (2021) Statistics of Income report indicated
that taxpayers at this income level receive about 6% of their total income from undocumented
sources (IRS, 2021). It is this undocumented income that is most likely to be underreported
(Williams & Round, 2009). The scenario is stated from a third-person perspective, which can
help adjust for social desirability bias (Bailey & Plecnik, 2020).
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Table 5
Hypotheses Matrix
Hypothesis

Survey
Items

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Variable
Level

Statistical
Analysis

H1: The
Bailey
likelihood to
and
morally
Plecnik
disengage is
(2020)
positively related scenari
to the likelihood
o and
to evade taxes.
Moore
et al.
(2012)
8 -item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Propensity to
morally
disengage

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation

H2: There is a
significant
relationship
between
displacement of
responsibility,
and the
anticipated
decision to evade
taxes

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
displace
responsibility
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation

H3: There is a
significant
relationship
between
attribution of
blame, and the
anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
attribute blame
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation
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Hypothesis

Survey
Items

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Variable
Level

Statistical
Analysis

H4: There is a
significant
relationship
between
distortion of
consequences,
and the
anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
distort
consequences
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation

H5: There is a
significant
relationship
between
dehumanization,
and the
anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
dehumanize
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation

H6: There is a
significant
relationship
between moral
justification, and
the anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
moral
justification
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation
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Hypothesis

Survey
Items

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Variable
Level

Statistical
Analysis

H7: There is a
significant
relationship
between
advantageous
comparison, and
the anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
advantageous
comparison
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation

H8: There is a
significant
relationship
between
euphemistic
language, and
the anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
use euphemistic
language (As a
subscale of
moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation

H9: There is a
significant
relationship
between
diffusion of
responsibility,
and the
anticipated
decision to evade
taxes.

Moore
et al.
(2012)
8-item
scale

Likelihood to
evade taxes

Likelihood to
diffuse
responsibility
(As a subscale
of moral
disengagement)

Continuous

Pearson
Correlation
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Chapter 4: Findings
The purpose of this study was to empirically determine whether a relationship exists
between the likelihood to morally disengage and likelihood to evade taxes. Previous studies on
moral disengagement have suggested investigation of the use of moral disengagement in various
contexts (Moore et al., 2012). The relationship between moral disengagement and tax evasion
has not previously been studied. Thurman et al. (1984) identified two neutralization techniques
that were more likely to be used in justifying tax evasion: denial of responsibility and denial of
injury. The current study does not support these findings. The relationship between the
likelihood to morally disengage and likelihood to evade taxes is significant. However, the
relationships between the likelihood to evade and neither the denial of responsibility nor denial
of injury were found to be significant. The single significant finding indicates a relationship
between the moral disengagement technique, advantageous comparison, and likelihood to evade
taxes. This chapter includes this finding along with descriptive characteristics of the sample and
findings of each of the eight hypotheses.
Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample
Data were collected by Survey Monkey in a random survey resulting in 162 usable
responses. The responses were completely anonymous to minimize social desirability bias in
measuring the variables. The participants ranged in age between 25 and 99 with at least 3 years
of experience filing their own tax returns. No additional criteria were specified. Additional
demographic data were collected for future research and are included in Table 6.
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Table 6
Demographic Data
Gender

Frequency

Percent

Male

82

46.3

Female

75

50.6

Prefer not to say

5

3.1

162

100.0

Frequency

Percent

25–29

27

16.7

30–44

55

34

45–60

57

35.2

>60

18

11.1

Prefer not to say

5

3.1

162

100.1

Frequency

Percent

African American

13

8.0

Asian

17

10.5

Hispanic

14

8.6

Non-Hispanic White

104

64.2

Other

7

4.3

Prefer not to say

7

4.3

162

99.9

Frequency

Percent

Business owner

13

8.0

Independent contractor

15

9.3

W-2 employee

134

82.7

Total

162

100.0

Total
Age

Total
Ethnicity

Total
Current Employment Status
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Religious Affiliation

Frequency

Percent

Catholic

36

22.2

Jewish

3

1.9

Muslim

2

1.2

None/Atheist/Agnostic

51

31.5

Other Christian

70

43.2

Total

162

100.0

Frequency

Percent

$25,000–$49,999

40

24.7

$50,000–$74,999

40

24.7

$75,000–$99,999

28

17.3

$100,000–$149,999

32

19.7

$150,000–$200,000

17

10.5

Missing

5

3.1

162

100

Household Income

Total

Results
This section describes the analysis of the variables considered in the current study. The
variables included the dependent variable (likelihood to evade taxes (EVADE)) and independent
variables (likelihood to displace responsibility (DSR), likelihood to attribute blame (AB),
likelihood to distort consequences (DC), likelihood to dehumanize (DH), likelihood to use moral
justification (MJ), likelihood to use advantageous comparison (AC), likelihood to use
euphemistic language (EL), and likelihood to diffuse responsibility (DFR)).
The research question sought to determine whether a significant relationship exists
between the likelihood to morally disengage (MD) and likelihood to evade taxes (EVADE). The
results indicate that the first hypothesis is supported. Therefore, there is a significant relationship
between the likelihood to morally disengage and likelihood to evade taxes. The Pearson
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correlation for the data revealed that the likelihood to evade taxes and likelihood to morally
disengage were positively related, r = +.392, n = 162, p<.001, two tails.
Table 7
H1 Results
Variable
EVADE

Pearson Correlation

MD (Mean)

EVADE

1

.392**

Significance (2-tailed)

MD

.000

N

161

161

Pearson Correlation

.392**

1

Significance (2-tailed)

.000

N

161

162

Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); EVADE = likelihood to evade
taxes; MD = likelihood to morally disengage

I performed a multiple regression to identify the significance of the relationship between
EVADE and each of the independent variables. For the purpose of this analysis, the predictor
variables were DSR, AB, DC, DH, MJ, AC, EL, and DFR. The predictor variables were treated
as continuous or interval data. The outcome variable, EVADE, was also treated as continuous or
interval in nature. Examination of the model summary table revealed an adjusted R2 of .183,
suggesting that the data were the appropriate fit for the model. Examination of Table 8 revealed
that one of the items, “Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it’s hardly
a sin to inflate your own credentials a bit” (AC) was a significant predictor for EVADE (p=.007);
therefore, H7 is supported. Examining the unstandardized beta shows that for every one unit of
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point one is less likely to implore the moral disengagement mechanism, advantageous
comparison (AC), and the participant is also less likely to evade taxes (EVADE) by .348.
Table 8
Results from Multiple Regression
Variable

Unstandardized

Coefficients
Std. Error

(Constant)

3.886

11.792

MJ

-.037

.146

EL

.048

AC

Standardized
Beta

t

Significance

.330

.742

-.026

-.253

.801

.216

.030

.222

.825

.348

.127

.270

2.750

.007*

DSR

.037

.121

.029

.308

.759

DFR

.207

.272

.118

.762

.447

DC

.010

.176

.007

.057

.954

DH

-.064

.138

-.049

-.466

.642

AB
.236
.137
.183
1.724
.087
Note. MJ = likelihood to use moral justification; EL = likelihood to use euphemistic language;
AC = likelihood to use advantageous comparison; DSR = Likelihood to displace responsibility;
DFR = likelihood to diffuse responsibility; DC = likelihood to distort consequences; DH =
likelihood to dehumanize; AB = likelihood to attribute blame

The interaction between DSR and EVADE was not significant; thus, H2 is not supported.
Thurman et al. (1984) characterized one making this justification because they did not
understand the rules. One possible explanation for the lack of relationship may be that the
vignette depicted a straightforward scene where one received income they knew should be
reported but did not. If the scenario was more complicated, the results may have been different.
Future research might explore scenarios not as clearly defined in the tax code.
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The interaction between AB and EVADE was not significant; therefore, H3 was not
supported. Thurman et al. (1984) used language indicating the government is careless with
people’s money, therefore they are justified in not paying taxes. The Moore et al. (2012) survey
question suggested that people who are mistreated have usually brought it on themselves. It may
be that our current “Me Too” movement may make this response politically incorrect in any
situation. A longitudinal study may shed some light on changing responses during changing
political and socioeconomic environments.
The relationship between DC and EVADE is also not significant, meaning H4 is not
supported. According to Moore et al. (2012), this mechanism is characterized by thinking it is
okay to take credit for ideas that are not your own. According to Thurman et al. (1984), this
mechanism infers that tax evasion is a victimless crime. About half (53.1%) of the Thurman et
al. respondents did not disagree with the statement, “It is not so wrong to fail to report certain
income since it does not really hurt anyone.” I would have expected the outcome to be similar in
the current study.
The moral disengagement mechanism, DH, is not a significant predictor of EVADE;
thus, H5 is not supported. This dehumanization mechanism may not be relevant to tax evasion as
it indicates poor treatment of others is necessary when people lack feelings. Thurman et al.
(1984) included a statement in their survey implying the taxpayer is the victim because of their
need for monetary assistance in times of inflation. Perhaps if the survey question was worded in
a way that tied it directly to the tax evasion scenario, the results may have been different.
The relationship between MJ and EVADE is also not significant; therefore, H6 is not
supported. The moral disengagement mechanism, MJ, is not a predictor of tax evasion. This
mechanism implies an appeal to higher loyalties. Notably, the McGee (2012) survey instrument
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employs phrases that draw on mechanisms of moral disengagement such as moral justification
asking whether it is okay to evade taxes if the government is corrupt, the money is wasted, or the
money is spent on causes I do not believe in. Positive responses are consistently high for these
questions. A meta-analysis of the surveys related to tax evasion and ethics would be helpful for
future research.
Similarly, EL is not a predictor of EVADE, meaning H7 is not supported. The wording in
the scenario did not utilize euphemistic language. The lack of congruency between the moral
disengagement instrument language and scenario was done purposely to avoid self-reporting
bias. However, the arrangement may have also eliminated the opportunity for the participant to
make the connection between their decision to pay taxes and their everyday ethical decisions.
Lastly, DFR is not a significant predictor of EVADE; therefore, H9 is not supported.
Thurman et al. (1984) used language indicating it is okay to not pay taxes because everyone is
doing it. Moore et al. (2012) conveyed the diffusion of responsibility mechanism by indicating
you cannot be blamed if an authority figure told you to do it. Future research involving a larger
sample size for comparison of responses by demographics may provide additional insights into
the lack of support for this and each of the unsupported hypotheses.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Early studies in fiscal psychology models of tax compliance indicated tax policies that
appealed to conscience were more effective at deterring noncompliance than threatening
penalties (Schwartz & Orleans, 1967). It was also noted that tax evaders do not necessarily
condone the behavior (Vogel, 1974). These early studies and those that followed suggest there is
a disconnect between what we think we should do and what we actually do. McGee and Benk
(2019) found that people justify their noncompliance with various explanations. For example, a
survey participant might claim it is okay to evade taxes if the government is corrupt or wastes
your money. These rationalizations help people justify their unethical behavior with moral
reasons for not complying or by comparing their behavior to something worse, blaming the tax
law complexity, among other reasons. We try to explain away why we just do not do the things
we know we should do. There is a disconnect between our ethical values and behavior; however,
the disconnect is not complete. We still want to feel good about the decisions we make. To feel
good about our decisions, we must come up with reasons or justifications. We may do this
subconsciously. We may do it either before or after the bad behavior. How is it that we can feel
good about our bad behavior while our conscience is telling us the behavior is wrong? Moral
disengagement theorists say we explain away the behavior using the various mechanisms tested
in the current study. A person may use one or more of these mechanisms and different
mechanisms in different contexts. The current study focused on a single context, tax evasion, and
sought to determine whether a relationship exists between tax evasion and moral disengagement.
Furthermore, this study sought to identify which mechanism is most likely to be used in that
context. The propensity to morally disengage has been found to be a significant predictor of
unethical behavior in organizations (Moore et al., 2012). The current study supports the general
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finding for a relationship between moral disengagement and unethical behavior and expands its
application to a new context—tax evasion. This study further validates the use of the Moore et al.
(2012) 8-item scale as a measure of the propensity to morally disengage. Moore et al. suggested
that the propensity to morally disengage may vary with context and that certain contexts may
trigger the disengagement. The authors also suggested that specific mechanisms may be used in
particular circumstances. The findings here, although not exhaustive, support the existence of a
relationship between moral disengagement and the likelihood to evade taxes. In addition, the
moral disengagement mechanism most likely to be triggered is advantageous comparison, where
the tax evader is likely to justify their planned behavior by mentally comparing it to some worse
crime. This study is limited in that only one tax evasion scenario was proposed. Future research
might explore the use of the same moral disengagement mechanism with varying amounts of
potentially unreported income. There may be an amount of income at which a taxpayer may use
a justification mechanism other than advantageous comparison. If a relationship exists between
an increase in the amount of income and the moral disengagement mechanism used, is it because
the taxpayer has subconsciously performed a cost/benefit analysis before disengaging? A study
along these lines would have an opportunity to incorporate previous research indicating
taxpayers perform a cost/benefit analysis when deciding whether to pay all of the taxes they owe.
The timing as to when the moral disengagement actually takes place is not definitive in the
research. Ascertaining whether the disengagement takes place before or after a cost/benefit
analysis is performed would add to our understanding of the taxpayers’ thought process. Future
research to determine the timing and potential coordination with economic considerations would
shed light on these missing pieces.
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Self-employed people are required to self-assess and pay their taxes on a quarterly basis.
They must think about their taxes more often than the employed individual whose wages are
subject to withholding. There is something to be said for not having seen the money in your bank
account before you pay your taxes as it eliminates the opportunity to spend it. The self-employed
person thereby has many opportunities to make taxpaying decisions during the year (every time a
quarterly payment is due). Future research on the relationship between tax evasion and moral
disengagement might focus specifically on self-employed individuals to determine whether a
relationship exists between the variables for this specific group of individuals and how the
findings compare to wage-earning employees.
This study is helpful to taxing authorities when considering how to ameliorate the tax
gap. Appeals to conscience have been shown to be effective in reducing noncompliance. An
appeal specifically addressing the taxpayer who uses the moral disengagement mechanism,
advantageous comparison, might use a comparison to get the point across. The “this is your brain
on drugs” advertisement in the 1990s was very engaging in comparing the brain on drugs to a
fried egg. A taxpayer using advantageous comparison might be moved if their actions were
compared to stealing; for example: “Stealing is a crime; not paying your taxes is stealing from
the government.”
This study is useful to academia as a tool to teach ethics to accounting majors. Engaging
students in a discussion on ethics through the use of these surveys could build a foundation for
such a class. This knowledge is important for all students, particularly accounting students, who
will be expected to uphold a strict set of ethical standards. Students must come to understand the
ways in which people may be lead or lead themselves astray and give into tax evasion.
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Appendix A
Moral Disengagement Instrument
Please insert the appropriate number in the space provided for the following statements.

1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6________7
Strongly Agree

Strongly Disagree

1._____It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about. (MJ)
2._____Taking something without the owner’s permission is okay as long as you’re just
borrowing it. (EL)
3._____Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it’s hardly a sin to inflate
your own credentials a bit. (AC)
4._____People shouldn’t be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just
doing what an authority figure told them to do. (DSR)
5._____People can’t be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends
are doing it too. (DFR)
6._____ Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal. (DC)
7._____ Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt.
(DH)
8._____ People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves. (AB)
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Appendix B
Income Tax Scenario
Instructions: Please read the following scenario and answer the question that follows. This
survey is voluntary. Your responses will remain completely anonymous.

Please insert the appropriate number in the space provided for the following question.
Pat is a taxpayer in the United States, whose primary income this year was $51,000 in salary
from a local business. Pat also earned $5,500 for other work done on the side. Pat’s regular
$51,000 salary was paid by direct deposits and reported on a W-2 form, while Pat’s other income
of $5,500 was paid in cash and not reported. While preparing the current year’s tax return, Pat
realizes that the $5,500 should be listed as “other income,” resulting in additional taxes.
However, Pat also knows that this income would be hard for an IRS audit to find. Pat could use
the extra money to pay expenses and decides not to report any of the $5,500 of cash income, to
avoid paying more taxes to the IRS.

How likely are you to agree with Pat and leave the additional income off your tax return?
1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6________7
Very likely to agree with Pat
Very unlikely to agree with Pat
Disagree

My primary ethnic background is (check all that apply):
___Non-Hispanic White

___Hispanic

____African-American

____Asian

____Other

My religious affiliation is:
____Catholic

____Other Christian ______Jewish _____Muslim ___None/Atheist/Agnostic

I have filed income tax returns for the past (check one):
0 years

1-3 years

3+ years

I am currently employed as an (check one):
Independent contractor

W-2 employee

Business owner

My gender is: _____Male

_____Female

_____Prefer not to say

My age is ____25–29 ____30–44
My ethnicity is

____45–60

_____African-American
_____Asian
_____Hispanic

____>60

____Prefer not to say
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_____Non-Hispanic white
_____Other
_____Prefer not to say
I am employed as an _____Business owner _____Independent contractor _____W-2 employee
My religious affiliation is

_____Catholic _____Jewish _____Muslim

_____Non/Atheist/Agnostic
_____Other Christian
My household income is:

_____$25,000–$49,999

_____$75,000–$99,999
_____$100,000–$149,999
_____$150,000-$200,000

_____$50,000–$74,999

